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INTRODUCTION
The Institute’s governing Council has au­
thorized a referendum on two proposed 
AICPA Code of Professional Ethics amend­
ments recommended for adoption by the 
board of directors. The bylaws provide that 
such amendments be submitted to all 
members of the Institute for a vote by 
mail ballot ninety or more days after 
Council authorization of the referendum.
This booklet presents a background 
statement, pro and con arguments apply­
ing to the proposals, the board of direc­
tors’ message to Council prior to the fall 
1978 meeting, and an opinion and legal 
memorandum from the Institute’s legal 
counsel.
In order to become effective, the amend­
ments must be approved by two-thirds of 
the members voting. Your ballot will be 
valid and counted only if received by 
March 31, 1979. Votes will be secret, but 
can be counted only if the authenticating 
card is signed and returned with the 
ballot. Unauthenticated ballots cannot be 
counted.
Donald J. Schneeman 
Secretary
5
BACKGROUND
Over a year ago, in September 1977, 
as a part of its overall response to de­
mands from several quarters that the pro­
fession update its standards, AICPA 
Council authorized a mail ballot of the 
membership to modify the advertising rule 
that until then had prohibited seeking 
clients by solicitation or advertising.
The modified rule, as drafted by the 
AICPA Professional Ethics Executive Com­
mittee and presented to Council at the 1977 
meeting, provided that “ A member shall 
not seek to obtain clients by advertising 
or other forms of solicitation in a manner 
that is false, misleading, or deceptive.” 
The committee announced its intention to 
interpret the rule to prohibit direct unin­
vited solicitation because it often leads to 
the making of ‘‘false, misleading, or de­
ceptive” statements that cannot be moni­
tored.
Council decided to include the inter­
pretation in the body of the rule and so 
added to the text drafted by the com­
mittee the sentence ‘‘A direct uninvited 
solicitation of a specific potential client is 
prohibited.”
The revised text was submitted to the 
membership early in 1978 and was adopted 
by approval of 72.2 percent of the mem­
bers voting.
Almost immediately, the ethics execu­
tive committee was asked whether the pro­
hibition against ‘‘direct uninvited solicita­
tion” was limited to “ in-person” solicita­
tion or included written solicitation tailor- 
made to the recipient. After extensive 
consideration, the committee has most re­
cently interpreted the prohibition to apply 
only to direct uninvited oral or in-person 
solicitation.
Since May 1977, prior to the 1977 action 
of Council, the Institute’s advertising, 
solicitation, and encroachment rules have 
been the subject of an inquiry by the 
United States Department of Justice. The 
department seems to agree that the por­
tion of the new advertising rule that pro-
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hibits only “ false, misleading, or decep­
tive’’ advertising conforms to existing law, 
since it has raised no objection to that 
portion.
However, the department challenges the 
legality of both rule 401 (encroachment) 
and that portion of rule 502 prohibiting 
direct uninvited solicitation, since neither 
one is limited by the “ false, misleading, or 
deceptive” standard. Prior to the October 
1978 Council meeting, the Justice Depart­
ment staff had recommended that the de­
partment initiate a complaint seeking to 
have the prohibitions against encroach­
ment and solicitation declared illegal and 
removed from the code.
Legal counsel for the Institute advised 
that the rule against encroachment seemed 
too broad a restraint to survive an anti­
trust attack and that it was unlikely the 
ban on direct uninvited oral or in-person 
solicitation could be successfully de­
fended. In an antitrust case, each rule 
would be regarded as a restraint on com­
peting CPAs and would be tested for 
whether or not it would be “ reasonable” 
in the antitrust sense. Recent cases in­
dicate that the rules would have to be 
shown to advance competition to be con­
sidered “ reasonable.” Legal counsel ad­
vised that they were not aware of facts that 
would sustain a defense that the rules were 
“ reasonable.”
In the light of these circumstances, 
Council overwhelmingly authorized a mail 
ballot to repeal the encroachment rule, 
and authorized a mail ballot to repeal the 
prohibition against direct, uninvited solici­
tation in rule 502 by a vote of 106 to 103. 
Thereafter, to avoid any implication that 
Council was recommending a favorable 
vote of the membership on the proposed 
change in rule 502, members of Council 
requested a record of their feelings re­
garding the rule 502 change. Their vote 
was recorded as 130 against the proposed 
change in rule 502 and 69 in favor of 
the proposal. No similar expression of 
opinion was requested regarding the pro­
posed repeal of rule 401 (encroachment).
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PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Text of Proposed Change (deletions in­
dicated by strikeover):
Proposal 1: Repeal of Rule 401 
(Encroachment)
Text of Rule to Be Repealed:
 Ru le 401— Encroachment
 A member shall not endeavor to provide a 
 person or entity with a professional service  
which is currently provided by another pub­
li c accountant except—
—He may respond to a request for a pro­
posal to render services and may furnish 
service to those who request it.—How­
ever, if an audit client of another inde­
pendent public accountant requests a 
member to provide professional- advice 
on accounting or auditing matters in 
connection with an expression of opin­
ion on financial statements, the member 
must first consult with the other accoun­
tant to ascertain that the member is 
aware of all the available relevant facts. 
2. Where a member is required to  express  
an opinion on combined or consolidated 
financial statements which include a  
subsidiary, branch, or other component 
audited by another independent public 
 accountant, he may insist on auditing- 
any such component which in his judg­
ment is necessary to warrant the  ex­
pression of his opinion.
A member who receives an engagement 
 for services by referral from another public  
 accountant shall not accept the client’s re­
quest to extend his service beyond the  
specific engagement without first notifying 
the referring accountant; nor shall he seek 
to obtain any additional engagement from
Proposal 2: Repeal of That Portion of Rule 
502 Relating to Direct Uninvited Solicitation
Rule 502— Advertising and Other Forms of 
Solicitation
A member shall not seek to obtain clients 
by advertising or other forms of solicitation 
in a manner that is false, misleading, or 
deceptive. A direct uninvited solicitation of 
a specific potential client is prohibited.
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ARGUMENTS APPLYING TO BOTH 
PROPOSALS
In Favor of the Proposals
If the rules are voluntarily repealed by the 
membership, the Institute would be in a 
position to discourage undesirable forms 
of solicitation and encroachment, to issue 
policy statements against such practices 
as unprofessional, and to urge members’ 
professional discretion in practice develop­
ment. This would permit flexibility in re­
sponding to the needs of the public and 
the profession.
There are occasions when the Institute 
must “ stand and fight.” This is not one 
of those occasions. The trend of the 
law in this area is clear, and the present 
state of the law pertaining to bans on 
solicitation and encroachment as ex­
pressed in the Institute’s code is such 
that the prospects of a successful anti­
trust defense are, at best, slim. Any 
vigorous attempt to preserve the chal­
lenged bans should be in the legislative, 
not the judicial, arena.
It is difficult to evaluate how the public 
would view a “ stand and fight” position 
by the profession. Such a position might 
be admired by some, but others would see 
it as a wasteful effort by the profession 
to preserve rules that interfere with the 
offering of professional services and that 
deny the public the perceived benefits of 
open competition.
Although the focus has been on govern­
mental pressure, a legal challenge to the 
bans could also come from other quarters, 
such as from a member disciplined for 
having solicited or encroached.
In the event a lawsuit is brought under 
the antitrust laws, even if the court does 
not order the rules removed from the code, 
the trend in recent decisions suggests that 
the court would limit any solicitation or 
encroachment rule to banning only that 
which is “ false, misleading, or deceptive” 
and would prohibit the Institute from ad-
10
vancing any policy against, or making any 
statements against, other undesirable 
forms of solicitation or encroachment.
The defense of an antitrust attack on 
the rules would be costly in terms of both 
legal fees and the time of those involved.
The proposed changes should be 
adopted because many practitioners al­
ready engage in various forms of solicita­
tion. It would be more honest and fair to 
all to make the changes and allow prac­
titioners to decide how best to practice 
their profession.
Adoption of the proposal would still 
permit the profession to prohibit unde­
sirable practice development activities, 
since rule 502 would still ban “ false, mis­
leading, or deceptive” advertising or solici­
tation.
Against the Proposals
The time has come for the profession to 
stand firm before the challenge of ever- 
increasing governmental interference.
Members should be willing to pay what­
ever the cost to maintain standards of 
behavior that have been hallmarks of their 
profession for many years. It would erode 
the dignity of the profession to abandon 
such standards voluntarily.
By making the proposed changes volun­
tarily, the Institute would invite even more 
governmental intervention in the profes­
sion’s affairs.
Some members believe that, while there 
has been an expression of intent, there 
is no certainty that the government will, in 
fact, make a formal antitrust challenge 
and that the likelihood of such a chal­
lenge would decrease if the profession’s 
resolve is clear.
The present rules promote honorable 
competition, but the amendment would 
permit all forms of solicitation and en­
croachment—so long as they are not 
“ false, misleading, or deceptive.” This
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would not be in the best interests of either 
the profession or the public.
The Institute’s repeal of the bans in 
question may cause many state CPA 
societies to adopt their own such bans, 
thus complicating the joint enforcement 
program.
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ARGUMENTS APPLYING  
SPECIFICALLY TO  
REPEAL OF RULE 401 
(ENCRO ACHMENT)
In Favor of the Proposal
The AICPA Professional Ethics Division 
has long been on record as favoring repeal 
of rule 401 because it is inconsistent with 
rule 502, which permits advertising and 
solicitation unless it is “ false, misleading, 
or deceptive.”
The rule has not been enforced because 
no definition of what constitutes encroach­
ment has been developed, and complaints 
have usually been brought under the ad­
vertising and solicitation rule (rule 502).
The rule in its present form creates a 
restraint of trade so broad that legal 
counsel has advised it cannot be suc­
cessfully defended as “ reasonable.” Thus, 
its existence as a rule of conduct invites 
antitrust attack that could involve other 
rules.
The elements of the rule that can be 
defended as “ reasonable”—those relating 
to “ shopping for accounting principles” 
and expressing opinions on consolidated 
financial statements—are related to the 
technical standards rules and can be 
issued more properly as interpretations 
thereunder.
Against the Proposal
There is no court decision that directly 
points to a learned profession’s encroach­
ment ban as unlawful on antitrust grounds; 
therefore, the validity of the government’s 
objection to the rule should be tested in 
the courts, not just accepted through 
voluntary action by the profession.
Portions of the rule offer useful guid­
ance to members, and that guidance might 
be less effective if such portions were to be 
published as a part of the profession’s 
technical literature.
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ARGUMENTS APPLYING  
SPECIFICALLY TO REPEAL OF 
DIRECT UNINVITED SO LICITATIO N  
BAN IN RULE 502
In Favor of the Proposal
The challenged portion of the rule most 
recently has been interpreted to prohibit 
only oral or in-person solicitation, and the 
AICPA Professional Ethics Division intends 
to amend its published interpretations to 
reflect this conclusion. This ban is so 
narrow that little would be lost by giving 
it up voluntarily, just as little would be 
gained in a costly fight to preserve it, 
even in the unlikely event of success.
As a practical matter, the rule is unen­
forceable. The only parties usually present 
at a solicitation are the CPA and the pros­
pective client; thus, typically there often 
is no evidence to support a disciplinary 
proceeding. Usually, clients do not want to 
be involved if the solicitation has been un­
successful; if it has been successful, they 
will not testify against their accountants.
The only credible public policy argu­
ment for retaining the ban would be that, 
in the view of some, solicitation tends to 
impair independence. Even if that argu­
ment were accepted by a court with 
respect to audit engagements, it is unlikely 
that the ban could be justified with respect 
to other professional services. Thus, a 
large segment of professional practice 
would not be covered.
Several state attorneys general have ad­
vised state boards of accountancy that, in 
view of the Bates case, it is unconstitu­
tional for a board to have an outright ban 
on solicitation. While the legal posture of 
professional associations differs from that 
of state licensing boards, the rules of con­
duct governing practice and professional 
behavior should not be permitted to differ 
in these respects.
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Against the Proposal
Legal counsel has not advised that the 
solicitation ban cannot be defended. They 
have advised only that the chance of suc­
cessful defense against an antitrust chal­
lenge is slender. As long as there is any 
possibility of success, the Institute should 
advocate the deeply held convictions of 
its members, regardless of cost.
The fact that the rule now would be 
interpreted narrowly—banning only oral or 
in-person solicitation—should strengthen 
an antitrust defense based on “ reasonable­
ness.”
The accounting profession is different 
from other professions in that auditors 
must be independent. Solicitation may 
impair an auditor’s independence. The 
reasonableness of having a prohibition 
against soliciting engagements requiring 
independence should be demonstrated— 
in court, if necessary.
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LETTER FROM BOARD OF  
DIRECTORS TO COUNCIL IN 
SUPPORT OF PROPOSALS
October 9, 1978
To the Members of Council of the 
American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants
At its October 21st meeting Council will 
consider two resolutions calling for the 
elimination of rule 401 (Encroachment) and 
the second sentence of rule 502 (Adver­
tising and Solicitation) of the rules of con­
duct. Enclosed is a letter and memoran­
dum from our attorneys, Willkie Farr & 
Gallagher, setting forth their opinion on the 
prospects of successfully defending the 
second sentence of rule 502 against an 
antitrust challenge.
Elimination of Rule 401
The elimination of rule 401 will remove 
the encroachment ban from the rules of 
conduct. The portions of the present rule 
relating to “ shopping” for accounting 
principles and expressing opinions on 
consolidated financial statements will be 
retained elsewhere in the technical litera­
ture of the profession. In the opinion of 
the professional ethics division and the 
board of directors, the encroachment ban 
was rendered meaningless and unen­
forceable, as a practical matter, when 
the membership adopted the Institute’s 
revised rule relating to advertising in 
March of this year.
Amendment of Rule 502
The second sentence of rule 502 reads 
as follows:
A direct uninvited solicitation of a specific 
potential client is prohibited.
The elimination of this sentence will 
place all forms of solicitation on the same 
footing as advertising. Accordingly, only 
false, misleading, or deceptive solicitation 
would be prohibited.
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The second sentence was added to the 
present rule 502 during the discussion at 
the Council meeting on September 17, 
1977. The professional ethics executive 
committee was proposing to issue an inter­
pretation prohibiting direct uninvited 
solicitation concurrently with adoption of 
revised rule 502. There was concern on 
the part of Council that the interpretation 
exceeded the scope of the proposed new 
rule 502, which reads as follows:
A member shall not seek to obtain clients 
by advertising or other forms of solicitation 
in a manner that is false, misleading, or 
deceptive.
Thus, the substance of the proposed inter­
pretation was added as a second sentence 
to the proposed rule 502 by a vote of 
Council and became effective by vote of 
the membership in March 1978.
Antitrust Challenge
As you are aware, the antitrust division 
of the Department of Justice has been 
carrying on an investigation of the AICPA 
Rules of Conduct since May 1977. Follow­
ing adoption of revised rule 502 by our 
members, the representatives of the anti­
trust division expressed the view that rule 
401 and the second sentence of rule 502 
are in violation of the antitrust laws.
Despite vigorous arguments by AICPA 
representatives and our attorneys in sup­
port of these prohibitions, we were in­
formed in early August that recommenda­
tions were being made within the Depart­
ment of Justice to proceed with a com­
plaint against the Institute in federal court 
for retaining rule 401 and the second 
sentence of rule 502. During the course 
of the discussions, we inquired whether 
such action would be deferred if we sub­
mitted a proposal to our board of directors, 
Council, and membership to eliminate the 
two prohibitions from our rules of conduct. 
While no officially binding assurance has 
been received, a complaint has not been 
filed to date, and we believe that action
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will be deferred pending the outcome of 
action on the changes we are proposing.
The trend of recent legal decisions gives 
us scant comfort and considerable doubt 
that the second sentence of rule 502 
can be retained. The Goldfarb case made it 
clear that the professions have no exemp­
tion from the antitrust laws. Shortly before 
the current rule 502 became effective, the 
Supreme Court decided the Professional 
Engineers case, striking down as violative 
of the antitrust laws an ethical rule against 
competitive bidding that the National So­
ciety of Professional Engineers had at­
tempted to justify on the ground that by 
suppressing price competition, it promoted 
quality and therefore public safety. In 
June of this year the Supreme Court de­
cided two cases, Ohralik and Primus, in 
which state bans on lawyer solicitation 
were challenged on constitutional grounds. 
These cases are discussed fully in the 
legal memorandum attached, and our 
attorneys have pointed out to us that the 
decisions will make it more, rather than 
less, difficult to defend the Institute’s en­
croachment and solicitation bans if they 
are challenged under the antitrust laws.
Board of Directors’ Recommendations
In view of the foregoing developments, 
the board of directors decided to propose 
the elimination of both rule 401 and the 
second sentence of rule 502 to avoid 
costly litigation that offers little or no pros­
pect of being resolved in the Institute’s 
favor. In reaching this decision, the fol­
lowing factors were considered, not all of 
which where given equal weight by every 
member of the board, but which, in the 
aggregate, impelled a unanimous re­
solution:
1. In view of legal counsel’s opinion, 
the prospects of a successful de­
fense in litigation were deemed too 
poor to warrant defending the issues 
through the courts. The cost of pro­
tracted antitrust litigation would be
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enormous and would pose potential 
damage to the posture of the profes­
sion in the eyes of Congress and 
government agencies.
2. The possibility of waiting for a com­
plaint to be filed by the Department 
of Justice and then seeking to nego­
tiate a consent decree was not an 
attractive one in the light of the 
current stringent rules governing 
antitrust consent decrees and in view 
of the negative public impression 
that would be created if the Institute 
backed down in the face of a com­
plaint. It was also recognized that 
consent decrees entail legal and 
administrative burdens of compliance 
over a period of years.
3. A limited ban against direct unin­
vited oral solicitation, even if sus­
tained, would be so narrow that its 
usefulness is open to serious doubt 
in view of the present permission of 
advertising and other forms of solici­
tation. Its value is probably not 
sufficient to warrant the expenditure 
of money, time, and effort required to 
defend it.
4. The prohibitions under question have 
been virtually unenforceable in the 
past because of a reluctance on the 
part of clients to provide corrobo­
rating evidence. While it can be 
argued that the mere existence of 
a prohibition has a salutary restrain­
ing influence, the inability to enforce 
rules can result in a cynical attitude 
toward the entire disciplinary pro­
cess.
5. Taking the initiative to eliminate the 
prohibitions might avoid the disad­
vantages of the other alternatives and 
might also yield some benefit from 
being seen as a positive step toward 
enlightened self-regulation.
In recommending that Council authorize 
a mail ballot to repeal the encroachment
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rule and the prohibition against direct 
uninvited solicitation, the board stresses 
that it does not favor the behavior the 
rules were intended to prohibit. The pro­
fession years ago adopted in good faith 
prohibitions against encroachment and 
solicitation as a measure of protection 
for the public. But times have changed, 
public expectations have changed, and 
the law has changed. Whatever argument 
for the social and professional desirability 
of the rule that can be put forward is un­
likely to sustain it in an antitrust proceed­
ing, and the adverse consequences of such 
a result would be substantial. The board 
of directors urges adoption of the re­
solutions as submitted.
Sincerely yours,
Stanley J. Scott
Chairman of the Board
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OPINION OF LEGAL COUNSEL
October 6, 1978
American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants 
1211 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, New York 10036
Gentlemen:
You have asked our legal advice as to 
whether the ban on direct uninvited oral 
or in-person solicitation, as it appears in 
the second sentence of Rule 502 of the 
Rules of Conduct, could be successfully 
defended if challenged as a violation of 
the federal antitrust laws.
A categorical opinion cannot be given 
on the present state of the law and the 
facts. However, we believe it unlikely the 
ban on direct uninvited oral or in-person 
solicitation could be successfully de­
fended. This is based upon: (1) our view 
that the ban must be analyzed as a re­
straint of trade under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act; (2) the direction and tenor of 
recent Supreme Court decisions in this 
unsettled area; and (3) the absence, so 
far as we are aware, of a credible and per­
suasive body of facts to sustain an anti­
trust “ rule of reason” defense.
The Supreme Court decision in Goldfarb 
v. Virginia State Bar made it clear that bar 
associations and other groups of learned 
professionals are not exempt from the 
prohibitions of the Sherman Act. There­
fore, an agreement, such as an ethical 
rule, restraining competition among those 
practicing a profession such as law, medi­
cine or accountancy is a restraint of trade 
within the meaning of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. The only distinction made 
between groups of learned professionals 
and other groups of competitors is that 
agreements by the former, not directly re­
lated to prices, will be tested under the 
“ rule of reason” rather than treated as 
per se violations of the Sherman Act.
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Therefore, we believe the solicitation ban 
in the second sentence of Rule 502, since 
not directly related to pricing, would be 
viewed as a restraint of trade and would 
be tested under the “ rule of reason” rather 
than declared a per se violation.
The tenor and direction of recent anti­
trust and constitutional decisions by the 
Supreme Court suggest that the justifica­
tions of a restraint such as the solicitation 
ban in the second sentence of Rule 502 
that will be deemed “ reasonable” are 
much more limited and difficult to sustain 
than was thought prior to those decisions. 
A memorandum discussing the signifi­
cance of those decisions is attached.
We believe it would be difficult to de­
velop the necessary facts to ground a 
successful defense of the solicitation ban. 
At the present time we are not aware of 
any consistent, credible and persuasive 
body of facts that would sustain the rea­
sonableness of that ban.
Very truly yours,
Willkie Farr & 
Gallagher
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW
To: American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants
From: Willkie Farr & Gallagher
Re: Blanket Ban on Solicitation—Antitrust 
Considerations
Dated: October 6, 1978
There are four recent Supreme Court de­
cisions which we believe bear upon the 
views we have expressed in the letter to 
which this memorandum is attached. Three 
of these decisions are under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu­
tion and deal with state bans on advertis­
ing and solicitation by lawyers. The fourth 
decision is under the federal antitrust laws 
and limits the scope of a successful “ rule 
of reason” defense.
The direction and tenor of those deci­
sions suggests a reduction in the prospects 
for a successful defense of an outright 
solicitation ban. The Antitrust Division of 
the United States Department of Justice 
appears to understand this and to have 
drawn considerable encouragement from 
those decisions in its deliberations on 
whether or not to proceed against AICPA. 
Similarly, we see no reason for AICPA to 
draw encouragement from those decisions 
or to undertake a defense of its solicitation 
ban based on those decisions.
Constitutional Considerations—  
Advertising
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona the 
Supreme Court held that a blanket state 
ban on all lawyer advertising was unconsti­
tutional under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and that the antitrust laws 
were not applicable to a state. The 
Supreme Court did not then decide the 
constitutionality of bans on solicitation or 
other types of advertising. It did refer 
specifically to the possible constitutionality 
of state bans on the type of lawyer solicita-
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tion that might occur under circumstances 
suggesting the existence of undue in­
fluence, but the scope of the decision in 
the Bates case was necessarily limited to 
the particular application of a state’s ban 
on lawyer advertising. As the more re­
cent Supreme Court decisions have made 
clear, the Bates decision did not declare 
constitutional or lawful any other bans on 
solicitation or advertising by professionals. 
It did, however, reject various defense 
arguments that would likely be rejected 
with even less hesitation in an antitrust 
“ rule of reason” case.
Antitrust Considerations
The majority opinion in United States v. 
National Society of Professional Engineers, 
an antitrust case, has been read by one 
dissenting justice as requiring a success­
ful “ rule of reason” defense to show that 
the challenged restraint is in fact pro- 
competitive. The anticompetitive restraint 
in that case (a competitive bidding ban) 
could not, in the opinion of the majority, 
be justified as reasonable on the ground 
offered—that it was designed to minimize 
the risk that competition would produce 
inferior engineering work endangering the 
public safety. Whether facts could have 
been developed to support that argument 
is not clear; in any event, the majority 
opinion was to the effect that the National 
Society of Professional Engineers would 
not be permitted to prove that the public 
policy behind the Sherman Act was subor­
dinate to the Society’s perception of the 
public policy in favor of engineering safety.
Constitutional Considerations—  
Solicitation
The two other decisions were in con­
stitutional cases not involving the antitrust 
laws. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n 
the state ban on lawyer solicitation was 
upheld as it applied to one of the most 
egregious and abusive instances of direct 
uninvited oral solicitation imaginable. (Two 
minors, injured in an automobile accident,
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were solicited by the lawyer in question in 
the hospital in the case of one girl and at 
home immediately after discharge from 
the hospital in the case of the other girl. 
It is difficult to conceive of a comparably 
repugnant set of facts occurring in an 
instance of solicitation by a certified public 
accountant.) The Supreme Court held a 
ban on lawyer solicitation constitutional as 
applied because the interests of the State 
of Ohio in protecting the public against 
those aspects of solicitation that might 
involve fraud, undue influence, intimida­
tion, overreaching and other forms of vexa­
tious conduct were paramount. Conversely, 
the objectives of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, as they relate to lawyer 
solicitation for pecuniary gain and where 
speech is merely a part of the means of 
such solicitation, were subordinate. In 
short, the Supreme Court balanced the 
public interest in protecting free speech 
against the public interest in preventing 
the evils of this type of lawyer solicitation 
and held that the latter outweighed the 
former in the particular circumstances of 
that case.
In the companion case of In re Primus 
the Supreme Court held that a ban on 
lawyer solicitation was unconstitutional as 
applied to Primus’ letter in behalf of an 
organization whose objective was to pre­
serve civil liberties. The First and Four­
teenth Amendment objectives of protecting 
various forms of free speech were held 
paramount, and the interests of the State 
of South Carolina in protecting the public 
against remote possibilities of undue influ­
ence, overreaching, misrepresentation, in­
vasion of privacy, conflict of interest and 
lay interference, as well as South Caro­
lina’s interests in preventing frivolous or 
vexatious litigation and minimizing com­
mercialization of the legal profession, were 
held subordinate on the facts of that case. 
Thus, the same balance was struck by the 
Supreme Court in Ohralik as in Primus, 
but with an opposite result.
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Significance of Decisions
In order to appraise the significance of 
the Ohralik and Primus decisions for Rule 
502, it is essential to recognize that those 
decisions involved lawyers, not account­
ants, and the rules banning lawyer solicita­
tion were promulgated by states, through 
their courts, and not by private profes­
sional organizations such as AICPA. As 
in the Bates case those decisions dealt 
with the constitutionality of state rules 
and not with the antitrust legality of rules 
of private professional organizations. The 
facts and the law in the two lawyer solicita­
tion cases differ from the facts (as we 
might best conjure them up) and the law 
in any antitrust case that might be brought 
on the application of the second sentence 
of Rule 502 to certified public accountants. 
However, the approach of the Supreme 
Court in balancing state interests does 
shed some light on the approach that 
might be taken by the Supreme Court in 
deciding an antitrust “ rule of reason” case. 
It is reasonable to expect that a state’s 
arguments (defending an advertising or 
solicitation ban) rejected in a constitutional 
case would fare no better when advanced 
by a private professional organization in 
an antitrust case.
Application of Precedent to 
AICPA Rules
It should be observed that the narrower 
the restraint the less difficult it is to justify 
as reasonable. The converse is also true. 
Indeed, it is the breadth of the outright or 
blanket ban on direct uninvited solicita­
tion, under any and all circumstances, 
even if limited to oral or in-person solicita­
tion, that the Antitrust Division challenges. 
However, a ban limited to solicitation 
(including advertising) that is false, mis­
leading or deceptive has been noted with 
approval by representatives of the Anti­
trust Division. Hence, their objection to 
the second sentence of Rule 502 and their
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apparent approval of the first sentence. 
Hence too, our frequently expressed pref­
erence for a ban limited to direct uninvited 
oral or in-person solicitation as opposed to 
a ban on all solicitation. The former would, 
of course, be less difficult to defend than 
the latter. Not surprisingly, the Antitrust 
Division representatives have questioned 
the motives of AICPA in desiring to retain 
a limited ban—and one so easily circum­
vented. They suspect a broader, less de­
fensible purpose.
The foregoing discussion assumes the 
threat of a civil proceeding against AICPA 
by the Antitrust Division seeking to enjoin 
the retention and enforcement of the direct 
uninvited solicitation ban. It should be 
recognized that there are other types of 
antitrust proceedings which could be 
brought against AICPA on account of its 
bans on encroachment and direct unin­
vited solicitation. For example, the Anti­
trust Division could bring a criminal pro­
ceeding which theoretically could result in 
fines and imprisonment. The possibility of 
such a proceeding being brought, or re­
sulting in such penalties if brought, ap­
pears extremely remote. There is a further 
possibility of a civil proceeding by the Anti­
trust Division seeking damages on behalf 
of the United States. We are not aware of 
any basis for damages being sought in 
such a proceeding and consider the pos­
sibility remote. Treble damages and injunc­
tive relief may be sought by private plain­
tiffs claiming injury to their business or 
property, and treble damages may also be 
claimed by state attorneys general on 
behalf of individual residents sustaining 
injury to their property by reason of the 
unlawful solicitation ban. Again, we are 
not presently aware of facts suggesting the 
likelihood of such proceedings or of dam­
ages that could be established in such 
proceedings.
In sum, if challenged, the oral solicita­
tion ban would likely be tested under the
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“ rule of reason’’ rather than disposed of as 
a per se violation. Related antitrust and 
constitutional cases suggest lines of de­
fense under the “ rule of reason,’’ although 
the decision in the Professional Engineers 
case may diminish the viability of those 
lines of defense.
Willkie Farr & Gallagher
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